A review of some of the evidence for the IPCC's conclusion that doubling CO2 levels will warm Earth significantly, in contrast to the claims of a recent article 1 . Simply looking at raw temperature and CO2 data over the past 150 years gives a transient response of roughly 2 K per doubling, in good agreement with IPCC conclusions based on far more extensive analysis. The 0.58 K of Ref. 1 is very unlikely.
II. SENSITIVITY RECONSIDERED, RECONSIDERED
But it is the "reconsidered" sections of Monckton's article which merit the most attention. The entire "radiative forcing reconsidered" section argues not about forcing at all, but about the temperature changes expected from forcings. Monckton ends by claiming he can divide the 3.7 W/m 2 forcing from doubling CO 2 by a factor of 3 because a certain temperature response is low -but this has nothing to do with the forcing at all, which is completely determined by the underlying physics. If anything, this section is an argument about feedbacks -but it is not phrased in that way, and so at the least is highly confusing.
Monckton culls a figure from the latest IPCC report (Monckton's figure 4, IPCC AR4 WG1 figure 9.1 3 ) which is discussed at length in section 9.2.2.1, "Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Response", but then misinterprets it. The image is based on estimates of forcing changes from 1890 to 1999. The strongest pattern is in the greenhouse gas image, because that is where the largest forcing change has occured. But the surface and low-altitude warming (or arXiv:0811.4600v1 [physics.ao-ph] 27 Nov 2008 cooling) patterns are essentially the same across all the forcings -as the IPCC discussion puts it: "Solar forcing results in a general warming of the atmosphere with a pattern of surface warming that is similar to that expected from greenhouse gas warming, but in contrast to the response to greenhouse warming, the simulated solar-forced warming extends throughout the atmosphere." The spatial pattern of response between different forcings differs only in the contrast between lower atmosphere and upper atmosphere: for solar forcing the warming happens everywhere, while for greenhouse forcing the upper atmosphere (stratosphere) cools while the surface and lower atmosphere warm. This differential in temperature change is readily observed, as Monckton's figure 6 shows: warming at the surface, and cooling in the stratosphere. This is observational proof that the sun cannot be behind recent warming.
The tropical mid-troposphere "hot spot" that Monckton highlights is not a "fingerprint" of greenhouse gases: it is well known to be a consequence of higher water vapor levels in a warmer world, whatever the cause of the warming. As warm air rises, it cools almost adiabatically -this is known as the "lapse rate", and stability of the atmosphere ensures that temperatures fall no faster than this rate with altitude. When air holding water vapor rises and cools, some of the water condenses and releases heat, resulting in warmer air at a given altitude, and a lower lapse rate. The strongest effect should show up in the tropical mid-troposphere 6 , hence a "hot spot". The observations are still being disputed, as even Monckton admits by refering to the wind-based measurements of Allen et al. Whatever the measurements and theory sort themselves out to on this, note again that tropical mid-troposphere temperature trends are not a signature of greenhouse gases, and this whole argument has no bearing on CO 2 forcing. Monckton has not made any case for arbitrarily dividing the forcing by 3 as in his equation 17. That would require drastically changing the spectroscopic properties of atmospheric constituents, for which there is certainly no justification in the arguments presented.
In his second "reconsidered" section, Monckton's errors of logic and interpretation are spread thickest, on a matter for which there is again no real dispute. Similar to (in fact much more so than for) the forcing, the "base" response of the climate system is tightly constrained by the spectroscopic properties and temperature profile of the atmosphere, and is easily calculated in any model. 9 multiplied by appropriate sensitivity-to-doubling numbers and adjusted to a 0 average for the HadCRUT3 baseline period 1961 to 1990. Other than the sensitivity number there is no free parameter here; this is entirely derived from observations. amounts to the inverse of Monckton's κ parameter is from 3.13 to 3.28 W/K mˆ2, with a mean of 3.22 and standard deviation of 0.04, or just over 1%. There is almost no uncertainty over the value of this number, despite the confusion Monckton fosters.
Finally, on the feedback factor f, and in particular the sum b of the feedback parameters, Monckton argues that the individual feedbacks must be too high because adding them plus their standard deviations leads to instability. He also quotes two papers that suggest that water vapor and cloud feedbacks are overstated by the climate models. The argument of the first "reconsidered" section on forcings, while completely irrelevant to forcings, if it had any validity would reinforce the suggestion of a reduced value for feedbacks. Nevertheless, Monckton here does the most mystifying thing in his entire article -he is "prudent and conservative" and retains the same (excessively high) value for the feedback sum b he has been using throughout the article.
But it is the feedbacks that are the most scientifically uncertain issues, by far the hardest things for modeling to get right, and the reason you cannot determine climate sensitivity from a one-page simple straightforward calculation. Getting the complex water vapor, cloud, lapse rate (convection and latent heat) and other responses to temperature changes sorted out is what makes climate modeling so tough. The feedbacks are the source of almost the entire uncertainty range in the IPCC's estimate of climate sensitivity (which also relies on measurements of recent and ancient climate). Somehow Monckton treats the least certain quantity of the three in his breakdown as the most certain, while wildly reducing the values of the other two. His final estimate (equation 30) is not believable on these and other grounds, including his many other errors 4 .
III. SIMPLER EVIDENCE
The simplest evidence I have seen that feedbacks are likely to be positive comes not from calculations but from measurements, dependent on the IPCC's radiative forcing calculations (table 2.12 3 ) where the forcings from 1750 to 2005 due to all sources except CO 2 almost cancel out (the net total is about 10% of the CO 2 effect, with considerable uncertainty). That means an estimate of transient climate response to increased CO 2 can be found by plotting the historically measured atmospheric CO 2 values on the same chart as the historical temperature anomalies, over the past 150 years as is done in Figure 1 .
The best fit to observed temperature is for a transient response of about 2K per doubling of CO 2 . This compares well with the IPCC range of transient climate response of between 1 K and 3.5 K (see section 9.6.2.3 of IPCC AR4 WG1 3 . The fact that the 20 th century rise in temperatures was of almost exactly the expected size is pretty strong evidence that the IPCC's transient and equilibrium climate sensitivity numbers match reality. In particular, the equilibrium sensitivity is unlikely to be as low as the 1.2 K found with no feedbacks, and nowhere near the 0.58 K that Monckton claims.
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